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Sovereign credit-default swaps
主权信用违约掉期
Smokescreen
烟幕
Blaming speculators for sovereign-debt woes is misguided. Banning them would be worse
因主权债务困境而指责投机者是错误的。禁止投机者投机将使情况进一步恶化
Mar 11th 2010 | From The Economist print edition
GREECE had a budget deficit of 12.7% of GDP in 2009. It has a record of dodgy accounting. Its own leaders acknowledge how dire its fiscal situation is. George Papaconstantinou, the country's finance minister, summed it up pretty well last month. “People think we are in a terrible mess. And we are.”
2009年希腊的预算赤字占其国内生产总值的12.7％。希腊的会计记录并不不可靠。希腊本国领导人承认其财政形势非常严峻。希腊的财政部长乔治·帕帕康斯坦丁（George Papaconstantinou）上个月总结得不错——“人们认为我们处在一个可怕的困境。而我们的确是这样。”
That hasn't stopped his boss, George Papandreou, and other European leaders from jabbing fingers elsewhere. To judge by this week's political rhetoric hair wigs, the blame for Greece's woes lies largely with speculators Synthetic Lace Wigs, who stand accused of buying sovereign credit-default swaps (CDSs), a form of insurance against government default, in the hope of profiting from jitters about sovereign debt. “Unprincipled speculators are making billions every day by betting on a Greek default,” said Mr Papandreou in a speech in Washington, DC.
这并没有阻止他的上司乔治·帕潘德里欧和其他欧洲领导人到处指责投机者。这并没有妨碍他的上司乔治•帕潘德里欧和其他欧洲领导人把指责的手指对准别人。根据本周的政治辞令判断，希腊的困境这次主要地可归咎于投机者，他们被控购买主权信用违约掉期——这是一种规避政府违约的保险——指望利用人们对主权债务的极度不安而渔利。 “这些投机者肆无忌惮，他们每天通过赌定希腊会违约而每天赚取数十亿，”帕潘德里欧先生在华盛顿演讲时说道。
The wheels of policy are now turning. The European Commission has said it will examine the case for banning “naked” sovereign CDSs, in which buyers of protection on government debt do not actually own any of the underlying bonds. A European ban would not do much good on its own: trading would simply move to other markets. The official American response to Mr Papandreou has been tepid. But the issue is on the G20's radar. The Financial Stability Board, which is co-ordinating international financial reform, thinks that tighter rules are likely.
政策的轮机正在开始运转。欧洲委员会已经表示将审查是否有必要取缔“无保险”主权信用违约掉期，其中政府债务保护的买家实际上不拥有任何优先债券。欧洲禁令不会对自己有很大的裨益：贸易可能只会转移到其他市场。美国官方对帕潘德里欧先生的回应一直是不冷不热。这个问题正在G20雷达的荧光屏上（受到重视）。旨在协调国际金融改革的金融稳定局认为应该收紧管控措施 Wig Caps。
Some reform of the market for sovereign CDSs is needed. Like other credit-default swaps, there is a strong case for moving these over-the-counter instruments on to central clearing-houses, which stand between buyers and sellers and reduce counterparty risk. Sensible changes of this kind are already in train in Europe and America. But the idea that speculators are to blame for Greece's troubles is wrong-headed, and the solution of banning naked sovereign CDSs is even worse.
一些针对主权信用违约掉期市场的改革是必要的。像其他信用违约掉期一样，有充足的理由要求把场外交易金融工具移到中央清算所，中央清算所沟通买卖双方，减少了交易对手风险。欧洲和美洲已经把这种明智的改变计划准备就绪。但是，指责投机者造成希腊困境的想法是固执错误的，而且禁止无保险主权信用违约掉期的解决办法更糟。
First, the diagnosis. The case against buyers of sovereign CDSs is that by driving up the price of insuring against default, they cause spreads on underlying cash bonds to widen, making borrowing more expensive and bringing default—and a big payout—closer. That drives up the price of insurance further, setting the cycle in motion again. The problem with this analysis is that the tail is far too puny to wag the dog. There are $9 billion of net Greek sovereign CDSs outstanding, compared with more than $400 billion of Greek government bonds. It is a similar story in other countries under pressure. According to the Bank for International Settlements, the proportion of net CDS positions to government debt is highest in Portugal, at just 5%. Moreover, CDS and bond prices have tended to move together, rather than one driving the other.
首先是诊断。反对主权信用违约互换购买者的理由是，抬高了对违约保险的价格，这引起优先现金债券的利差扩大，使贷款成本加大，使得违约风险更近——因为贷款成本加大而产生一大比支出。这又驱动了保险价格的进一步上升，循环往复。这一分析的问题是，局部掩盖整体。希腊有90亿美元的净主权信用违约掉期发行在外，与之相比，却发行超过4000亿美元的政府债券。在其它面临财政压力的国家也是类似的情况。根据国际清算银行的资料，净信用违约掉期头寸占政府债券的比例最高的是葡萄牙 synthetic wigs，但也仅为5％。此外，信用违约掉期和债券的价格往往一起移动（变动），而不是一个驱使另一个的价格。
Naked self-interest
赤裸裸的自利心
Even so, surely it cannot be right for people who do not own any government debt to profit from sovereign distress? Actually, it can. When states get into trouble, other borrowers suffer too: taxes rise, economies slow. So investors in Greek companies have legitimate reason to protect themselves against Greek sovereign risk. If they cannot, they will simply charge companies a higher risk premium instead. Buyers of protection also have to find sellers—banks, say, or hedge funds. But sellers want to offload their risk as well. If sellers are not allowed to buy protection themselves, investors will find it harder to hedge. If so, banning naked CDSs could end up making it more expensive for governments to borrow.
即便如此，不拥有任何主权债务的人就不能从债务危机中获利吗？其实，是可以的。当国家陷入困境，其他借款人也受损：税收增长，经济放缓。因此，希腊公司的投资者有正当的理由保护自己免受希腊主权危机风险。如果他们不能，他们只会向企业要求更高的风险溢价。保险的购买者也必须找到卖家，例如银行或对冲基金。但是，卖方也想规避风险。如果卖方不被允许为自己买保险，投资者将很难进行风险对冲。如果是这样，禁止无保险的信用违约掉期最终可能使政府借款成本更高。
There is a long tradition of shooting messengers who bring bad news. But the simple explanation for rising borrowing costs—Greece's finances are tatty—makes far more sense than the complex, politically convenient one. The sovereign-CDS debate is a smokescreen to obscure an unpalatable truth.
枪毙带来坏消息信使的做法是古来有之。不过，用希腊财政一塌糊涂这个简单的解释来阐明为什么借贷成本节节升高， 这要比用那些繁琐复杂、政治上于己方便的理由，更要讲得通许多。关于主权信用违约掉期的辩论是烟幕，掩盖了一个令人不快的真相。
金融词汇备忘
credit-default swaps:信用违约互换
counterparty risk:交易对手风险，又称信用风险。 |
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发表于 2010-12-20 09:48
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